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Casenote

Whoa, Slow Down! Applying the
Constitutional Brakes to
Accelerated Punitive Damages Awards

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,' the
United States Supreme Court held that a $145 million punitive damages
award violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
when compensatory damages are merely $1 million. This decision was
neither the first of its kind, nor unexpected, considering the Court's
trend in recent years. Nonetheless, the Court has not always been so
aggressive in its application of the Due Process Clause to punitive
damages awards.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1981 Curtis Campbell ("Campbell") and his wife, Inez, were driving
along a two-lane highway in Utah. In front of them was a group of six
vans, one of which was driven by Robert Slusher ("Slusher"). Campbell
attempted to pass the caravan. At the same time, Todd Ospital
("Ospital") was driving a vehicle in the opposite direction. To prevent a
head-on collision with Campbell, Ospital swerved onto the shoulder.

1. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
2. Id. at 1526.
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Ospital lost control of his vehicle and crashed into the van driven by
Slusher As a result, Ospital was killed and Slusher was seriously
injured. The Campbells were unhurt.'
Slusher brought a tort action against Ospital's estate and Campbell.
The Ospital estate filed a cross-claim for wrongful death against
Campbell. Campbell responded by asserting he was not at fault.
Campbell's insurance carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company ("State Farm"), assigned Ray Summers ("Summers"), a claims
adjuster, to analyze the claims. Although initial investigations were
inconclusive, Summers discovered that all of the eyewitnesses believed
Campbell was the primary cause of the accident. Furthermore,
photographs of the scene and skid-marks appeared to corroborate the
eyewitnesses' beliefs. Summers concluded that taking the claims to trial
would expose Campbell to a high probability of a judgment in excess of
his $50,000 policy limit. Therefore, Summers advised State Farm that
it would be wise to settle the claims. Despite the physical evidence and
Summers's evaluation, State Farm decided to contest liability. State
Farm's divisional superintendent ordered Summers to alter his report
concerning Campbell's liability. State Farm did not notify Campbell of
Summers's evaluation and findings, nor did State Farm tell Campbell
that he would be legally liable if he was found even partially at fault.
Instead, State Farm assured Campbell there was no evidence supporting
his liability and told him there was4 no danger of a judgment being
rendered in excess of his policy limit.
Before trial State Farm declined numerous offers by the Ospital estate
and Slusher to settle their claims for the policy limit of $50,000 ($25,000
per claimant). At trial in 1983, a jury found Campbell to be 100 percent
at fault and rendered verdicts against him totaling $185,849 (after jury
offsets). State Farm informed Campbell that it would pay the policy
limits, but the difference was Campbell's liability. State Farm moved for
a new trial or, alternatively, judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The
motions were denied and judgments were entered in favor of Ospital's
estate and Slusher. State Farm appealed. Campbell retained his own
counsel regarding the excess judgment and provided information about
his assets. State Farm refused demands by Campbell, Slusher, and
Ospital's estate to pay the full amount of the excess verdict. It
maintained this stance for the next three years.5
In January of 1984, the parties reached an agreement whereby
Campbell agreed to seek a bad faith action against State Farm. Slusher

3.
4.
5.

Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 133-34.
Id. at 134-36.
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and the Ospital estate would receive ninety percent of any recovery,
equally divided. In exchange the Ospital estate and Slusher agreed not
to seek satisfaction of their claims against Campbell's personal assets.
In July 1986 Campbell filed suit against State Farm for bad faith.' The
suit was dismissed "pending the final disposition of the underlying
action against Campbell."7 Ultimately, in June 1989, the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed the judgments against Campbell. The next month State
Farm paid the entire $185,849 judgment.8
In August of 1989, Campbell filed another complaint against State
Farm alleging: "1) a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing; 2) the tort of bad faith; 3) a breach of fiduciary duty; 4)
fraudulent misrepresentation; and 5) intentional infliction of emotional
distress."9 Campbell further claimed State Farm's conduct warranted
punitive damages because it acted maliciously, deliberately, and with a
conscious disregard of Campbell's interests.10 State Farm moved for
summary judgment, and the district court granted its motion because
"the insurer immediately satisfied the entire excess judgment when it
became final.""
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded the
case.' 2 The court determined that "material facts [existed] . ..which,
if believed, might lead a jury to conclude that State Farm acted in bad
faith."" On remand State Farm moved "in limine to exclude evidence
of alleged conduct that occurred in unrelated cases outside of Utah." 4
The trial court denied the motion. However, the court granted State
Farm's motion to bifurcate the trial into two phases, each with different
juries. The first phase would determine State Farm's liability. If State
Farm was found liable, the second phase would take place to address
damages.'"
The jury in the first phase found State Farm's decision not to settle
unreasonable because evidence demonstrated "there was a substantial
likelihood of an excess verdict."" Before the second phase, State Farm
again moved to exclude evidence concerning dissimilar out-of-state

6. Id. at 135.
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. Id.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 136.
Id.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 141.
State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1518.
Id.
Id.
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conduct based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore.'7 The trial court denied this motion, finding such
out-of-state conduct admissible evidence because it could establish
"whether State Farm's conduct.., was indeed intentional and sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages."18
In the second phase, State Farm argued that its decision to take
Campbell's case to trial was an "honest mistake," and thus punitive
damages were not warranted. 9 To counter this assertion, Campbell
introduced evidence of State Farm's business practices for over twenty
years in different states.2 ° This evidence revealed a "national scheme"
whereby State Farm sought to meet corporate goals by capping payouts
on claims. 2' This nationwide scheme "was referred to as the 'Performance, Planning, and Review,' or 'PP & R,' policy."22 Campbell claimed
that State Farm's decision to take his particular third-party claim to
trial was a result of this national scheme. To demonstrate the existence
of the PP & R policy, Campbell introduced expert testimony concerning
State Farm's fraudulent practices in its nationwide operations.3
Consequently, "the jury awarded [Campbell] $2.6 million in compensatory damages, and $145 million in punitive damages."24 The court denied
all of State Farm's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.2"
Nevertheless, the trial court ordered a remittitur of damages to "$1
million in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages."26 Both parties appealed.2 7
The appeal went before the Utah Supreme Court in October of 2001.
The court determined that under Utah law, there were several factors
to consider:
(i) the relative wealth of the defendant; (ii) the nature of the alleged
misconduct; (iii) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct;
(iv) the effect thereof on the lives of the plaintiff and others; (v) the
probability of future recurrence of the misconduct; (vi) the relationship
of the parties; and (vii) the amount of actual damages awarded."

17. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
18. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1518-19.
19. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1143 (Utah 2001).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.

23. Id.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1145.

28. Id. at 1145-46.
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After separately analyzing the factors, the court concluded that the
punitive damages award was appropriate.2 9 However, the court
disagreed with the trial court's analysis of factor seven and its subsequent decision to remit the punitive damages to $25 million.3 ° The
court stated that "if the other six factors support a large punitive
damages award, a judge should not decrease the amount solely because
of the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages."3 1
The Utah Supreme Court then analyzed federal law and applied the
three guideposts the Supreme Court identified in Gore to the issue of
whether punitive damages are grossly excessive. 2 As it did in analyzing the second and third state factors, the court looked at the evidence
Campbell presented regarding State Farm's nationwide PP & R policy
and held that State Farm's conduct was reprehensible.33 The court
concluded that the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages
was reasonable.3 4 In doing so, the court noted, "State Farm's fraudulent conduct has been a consistent way of doing business for the last
twenty years . ... ,3 Furthermore, the court noted that State Farm
would likely continue its misconduct as evidenced by its actions toward
the Campbells "despite a previous $100 million punitive damages
award."36 Finally, statistical probability demonstrated that State Farm
would be punished in only one out of every 50,000 cases; thus, "the harm
propagated by State Farm is [comparatively] extreme ....
Finally, the court compared the punitive damages award to other civil
and criminal penalties that could possibly be imposed upon State
Farm. 3' The court determined that the punitive damages were not
excessive when compared with a "$10,000 fine for each act of fraud, the
suspension of [State Farm's] license to conduct business in Utah, the
disgorgement of profits, and imprisonment."39 Therefore, the court
reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award.40 State Farm
appealed, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.41

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.

1152.
1151.

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1154-55.
State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1519.

40.
41.

Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1155.
535 U.S. 1111 (2003).

1152 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 568).
1154.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

840

[Vol. 55

In a 6-3 decision, the United States Supreme Court held that when
compensatory damages are $1 million, the award of $145 million in
punitive damages is excessive and violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A deeply ingrained principle of common law is that in tort actions, a
jury may impose punitive damages based upon the enormity of the
offense.'
The common-law approach for awarding punitive damages
has been for a jury to initially determine the amount. 44 Before
deliberating, the jury is instructed to assess the punitive award by
considering the gravity of the wrong and the need for deterrence of
similar conduct. 4' The jury's determination "is then reviewed by trial
and appellate courts to ensure that it is reasonable."46 Before the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court approved
this common-law approach to assessing punitive damages.4 7 In Day v.
Woodworth," the Court held that the assessment "has always been left
to the discretion of the jury, as the degree of punishment to be thus
inflicted must depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case."49
Even after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
adhered to the common-law assessment of punitive damages.5 0 In
assessing punitive damages, "[tihe discretion of the jury ... is not
controlled by any very definite rules; yet the wisdom of allowing such
additional damages to be given is attested by the long continuance of the
practice."5 1
Nonetheless, one cannot overlook the substantive and procedural
importance of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause
contained therein. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any

42.
43.

State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.
Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851).

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991).
47. See, e.g., Day, 54 U.S. at 363.
48. 54 U.S. 363 (1851).

49. Id. at 371.
50. See Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885); Barry v. Edmunds, 116
U.S. 550 (1886); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889); Standard
Oil Co. of Ind. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270 (1912).
51. Humes, 115 U.S. at 521.
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person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "2
The application of the Due Process Clause to a state's imposition of
punitive damages has been addressed by the Court on many previous
occasions.5" In Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. Seegers,54 the Court
made a vague determination that the Due Process Clause establishes
certain substantive limits beyond which a state may not impose a
penalty.5 However, the Court failed to provide any guidance regarding
the limits of punitive damages.5" Future holdings proved no more
helpful because the Court appeared to go through different stages of
interpretation. Initially, the Court made tactful "dance steps" around
the issue; then the Court demonstrated an air of reluctance to limit
punitive damages; finally, the Court began to arbitrarily limit punitive
damages through the procedural and substantive aspects of the Due
Process Clause.
A.

DancingAround the Issue

Numerous cases have come before the Supreme Court in which the
appellant challenged a state court's imposition of a punitive damage
award. For years the Court declined to directly address whether a
punitive damages amount could violate the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 7 one of appellant's arguments was
that Alabama's lack of sufficient standards governing the imposition of
punitive damages violated the Due Process Clause. 5 Having decided
that the state justice's biased participation in the trial violated
appellant's due process rights, the Court found it unnecessary to address
the issue of punitive damages.5 9 However, the Court stated that the
argument raised important issues, "which, in an appropriate setting,
must be resolved."6'
Two years later an opportunity for "an appropriate setting" presented
itself. In Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,"' defendant, a life

52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
53. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73 (1907); St. Louis, Iron
Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919); Standard Oil Co. of Ind., 224 U.S.
270; S.W. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas,
212 U.S. 86 (1909).
54. 207 U.S. 73 (1907).
55. Id. at 78-79.
56. See id.
57. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
58. Id. at 828.
59. Id. at 827-28.
60. Id. at 828-29.
61. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
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insurance company, appealed a $1.6 million punitive damages award.62
The Court refused to decide whether the size of the award violated any
provisions of the Constitution. 3 Instead, the Court concluded that
"these claims were not raised and passed upon in the state court" and
declined to reach them at this stage of litigation.'
Similarly, in
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,65
the Court refused to inquire whether the Due Process Clause establishes
outer limits on the size of punitive damages because appellant failed to
raise the due process argument in the lower courts.6 6 However, the
Court did narrow the issue-"whether due process acts as a check on
undue discretion to award punitive damages in the absence of any
express statutory limit." 7
B. Reluctance by the Court to Directly Curtail the Amount of
Punitive Damages
While previous opinions demonstrated the Court's acknowledgement
that the Due Process Clause might establish some substantive boundary
on punitive damage awards, the Court seemed reluctant to establish that
boundary when forced to directly address the issue. In Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,' Pacific Mutual appealed a jury's
assessment of punitive damages, claiming the award violated its due
process rights. The suit was initiated when several insured employees
of an Alabama municipality brought suit against Pacific Mutual alleging
fraud.69 The jury returned general verdicts for the insured employees
totaling $1,077,978.70 These verdicts represented both compensatory
and punitive damages; however, the relative amount of punitive
damages represented more than four times the amount of the compensatory damages. 7' The Alabama Supreme Court upheld the verdict, with
two justices dissenting.7 2
Before analyzing the case, the Court voiced its "doubts about the
constitutionality of certain punitive damages awards."73 The Court

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 76.
Id.
Id. at 76-77.
492 U.S. 257 (1989).
Id. at 277.
Id.
499 U.S. 1 (1991).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 9.
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then acknowledged the interface between a punitive damage amount and
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 4 The Court's
analysis first focused on the constitutionality of the common-law method
for assessing punitive damages.7" After reviewing past decisions, the
Court stated, "[W]e cannot say that the common-law method for
assessing punitive damages is so inherently unfair as to deny due
process and be per se unconstitutional."76 However, the Court recognized that unlimited jury or judicial discretion in the assessment of
punitive damages may yield excessive verdicts that "jar one's constitutional sensibilities."7 7 Despite this rhetoric, the Court refused to draw
a "mathematical bright line" between constitutionally acceptable and
unacceptable punitive damages awards.78 Instead, the Court stated
that "general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from
the court when the case is tried to a jury properly enter into the
constitutional calculus."7 9 As a result, the Court closely examined the
instructions to the jury.80 The trial court told the jury that the purpose
of punitive damages was not to compensate the injured victim but to
punish the defendant and to deter the defendant and others from
committing similar misconduct in the future.8 ' The Court found the
instructions sufficiently narrow to pass constitutional muster because
the discretion "was confined to deterrence and retribution, the state
policy concerns sought to be advanced."8 2 The Court concluded that the
necessary objective criteria existed for the punitive award to be
constitutional.8 3 The Court supported its conclusion by stating, "As
long as the discretion is exercised within reasonable constraints, due
process is satisfied." 84
Two years later, the Court again was presented with an opportunity
to establish a more finite determination for the constitutionality of a
punitive damages award in TXO ProductionCorp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp.85 Although the Court again recognized the existence of precedent
appearing to impose substantive limits on punitive damage awards, the

at
at
at
at

11 (citing Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71; Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813).
15.
17.
18.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 20.
509 U.S. 443 (1993).
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Court affirmed a jury verdict of $10 million in punitive damages when
compensatory damages were merely $19,000.86 The appellant urged
the Court to heighten the scrutiny level by applying objective criteria,
which would comport with "fundamental fairness" inherent in the
concept of due process of law."7 The Court, however, cited Haslip, in
which it refused to "'draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that
would fit in every case.'""8 The Court concluded that the disparity
between an award of punitive and actual damages was not controlling
when deciding the constitutionality of the punitive award. 9 The Court
"consider[ed] the magnitude of the potential harm that the defendant's
conduct would have caused ... as well as the possible harm to other
victims."" Thus, the punitive award was determined not to violate the
Due Process Clause. 91
C. The Court Begins to Draw an Arbitrary Boundary of Punitive
Damage Limits vis-d-vis the FourteenthAmendment
One year after TXO, the Court maneuvered a reversal of a punitive
damages award without establishing any kind of substantive limit. In
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,92 the Court did not concern itself with
substantive characteristics of "excessive punitive damages" but instead
focused on the procedures "necessary to ensure that punitive damages
are not imposed in an arbitrary manner."" An Oregon jury awarded
Oberg $919,390 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive
damages.' Although Oregon law provided the jury with discretion to
determine the punitive amount, Oregon's judicial review differed
dramatically from common law in that Oregon provided no procedure for
altering or reducing a punitive award if the defendant's only basis of
appeal was its objection to the amount of the award.9 5
Honda appealed contending that the Due Process Clause was violated
because the punitive damage award was excessive and Oregon courts
lacked the power to alter excessive verdicts.9 6 Because Oregon's

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 466.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 458 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
Id. at 459-60.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 465-66.
512 U.S. 415 (1994).
Id. at 420.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 418-19.
Id. at 418.
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judicial review of punitive damages awards departed from traditional
procedures, the Court limited the issue to "whether the Due Process
Clause requires judicial review of the amount of punitive damage
awards."9 7 The Court held that Oregon's practice provided no protection to ensure that the defendant was not subjected to an arbitrary
amount of punitive damages.98 The Court stated that the "whole
purpose" of the Due Process Clause was to prevent "arbitrary deprivations of liberty or property."99 Therefore, judicial review upon a
defendant's objection to the amount is a necessary aspect of due process
because the jury is given wide discretion in determining the amount.'0 0
As a result, the Court concluded that Oregon's denial of judicial review
did not comply with the Due Process Clause.'0 '
In Honda the Court demonstrated its willingness to find a punitive
damages award unconstitutional vis-&-vis the procedural aspect of the
Due Process Clause. 10 2 Nonetheless, as the Court noted, the common-law
practice of judicial review was applied by every other state. 0 3 Thus,
it was doubtful the Court would be confronted with a similar case in
which it could reverse a punitive award based on an unconstitutional
procedural method. The next time the Court was presented with a case
concerning the constitutionality of punitive damages, it would have to
again struggle with what, if any, substantive limits are imposed by the
Due Process Clause, and if there are limits, how those limits are to be
determined.
The Court received its chance in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 4 in which a jury entered a verdict in the amounts of $4000 in
compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages.' 5 Defendants appealed, contending the punitive amount was not constitutionally
permissible." s The Alabama Supreme Court reduced the punitive
award to $2 million because the jury computed the original amount by
considering BMW's conduct in other jurisdictions.0 7 BMW appealed,

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 420.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 434-35.
Id. at 435.
See id. at 432-35.
Id. at 426.
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
Id. at 565.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 567.
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and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to identify the character of
unconstitutionally excessive punitive damages awards.'
The Court first held that Alabama lacked the power to punish a
national corporation "for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and
that had no impact on Alabama or its residents."0 9 However, the
Alabama Supreme Court reduced the punitive amount because the jury
improperly considered BMW's out-of-state conduct." 0 Consequently,
the Court had to look elsewhere to identify the character of an excessive
award."' The Court subsequently inquired into the "[e]lementary2
notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence."1
From this inquiry, the Court developed the concept of "fair notice,"
according to which a person must receive notice of conduct capable of
being punished and the severity of the penalty."3 The Court thus
created "three guideposts" to analyze whether BMW received adequate
notice of the degree of the sanction Alabama could impose." 4
The first guidepost was "the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct."" 5 This was described as "perhaps the most
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award,"" 6 because punitive damages should mirror "'the enormity of
the offense.'""' 7 When examining this guidepost, the Court found that
Gore's injury was purely economic."' Moreover, the record showed
that BMW made "no deliberate false statements, acts of affirmative
misconduct, or concealment of evidence of improper motive, such as were
present in Haslip and TXO."" 9 As a result, the Court concluded that
BMW's conduct was not sufficiently
reprehensible to justify a $2 million
1 20
punitive damages award.

The second guidepost was the ratio of the punitive damages award to
actual harm suffered by the plaintiff.'21 The Court noted that its
decisions in both Haslip and TXO supported a comparison between the

- the

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 568.
Id. at 572-73.
Id. at 567, 573.
Id. at 573-74.
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id. at 574-75.
Id. at 575.
Id.
Id. (quoting Day, 54 U.S. at 371).
Id. at 576.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 580.
Id.
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two amounts. 22 The punitive damages award imposed against BMW
was 500 times more than the amount of actual damages, but considering
potential future harm was not appropriate because there was no
evidence that Gore or any other car buyer in Alabama was threatened
by BMW's conduct."
As a result, the Court concluded that the
disparity between the punitive damages amount and the actual damages
from previous cases in which the Court
amount was distinguishable
124
upheld the punitive award.
The third and final guidepost created by the Court was "[clomparing
the punitive damages award and the civil or criminal penalties that
could be imposed for comparable misconduct." 2 5 Under Alabama law,
the misconduct of the type BMW perpetrated was subject to a penalty
Other states authorized a penalty up to $10,000.127
of $2000.126
Nevertheless, the Court stated that none of these statutes provided
thereof would subject BMW to a multiBMW with notice that 1violations
28
million dollar penalty.
After considering the three guideposts, the Court was "fully convinced
that the grossly excessive award in this case transcend[ed] the constitutional limit."129 Despite this firm conviction, the Court ended its
opinion by again emphasizing its refusal to create a substantive bright
line whereby the constitutional boundaries of punitive damages awards
could be mathematically calculated.' 0 However, the Court did state,
"[w]hen the ratio is a breathtaking 500 to 1,. . . the award must surely
'raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.'"' 3 '
Five years later the Court addressed the Gore guideposts in a limited
3 2
manner in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.
The Court held that the courts of appeals should apply a de novo
standard of review when considering the three Gore factors. 3 3 However, this decision did little to clarify the substantive limits of punitive
damages as defined by the Court's Gore guideposts.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 581.
Id. at 582.
Id.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 584.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 585-86.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 583 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 481 (O'Conner, J., dissenting)).
532 U.S. 424 (2001).
Id. at 443.
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III. THE COURT'S RATIONALE
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,14 the
Court reiterated its concern that "[w]hile States possess discretion over
the imposition of punitive damages, it is well established that there are
procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on these
awards."" 5 The Court further stated that "grossly excessive or arbitrary
punishments on a tortfeasor" are prohibited by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 ' Another concern of the Court was
the information given to the jury and the jury's subsequent wide degree
of discretion in assessing punitive damages.13 7
To pacify its concerns, the Court explicitly relied on Gore, analyzing
each of the three guideposts in detail." In addressing the degree of
reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct, the Court enumerated several
factors to consider when gauging the degree of reprehensibility:
The harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious
conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health
or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability;

the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and
the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or
mere accident.'39
The Court further elaborated that the existence of any one of these
factors does not render a defendant's conduct wholly reprehensible to
justify a particular punitive award."4° The Court applied this reasoning
to the instant case and found that several of the factors were satisfied.'
The lower court found that State Farm's agent altered the
company's report regarding Campbell's culpability; State Farm
disregarded the high probability that taking the case to trial would yield
a verdict in excess of Campbell's policy limit; and State Farm intensified
the harm by assuring the safety of Campbell's assets and then telling
him to sell his house.'42 Despite these facts tending to demonstrate
State Farm's conduct as significantly reprehensible, the Court stated,
"[A] more modest punishment for this reprehensible conduct could have
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
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satisfied the State's legitimate objectives, and the Utah courts should
have gone no further."'"
Instead of limiting the focus of State Farm's conduct to in-state
activities, Campbell sought to expose State Farm's activities performed
nationwide ("PP & R policy").'" As the Court established in Gore, a
state cannot impose sanctions for the purpose of deterring or punishing
conduct that may be lawful in jurisdictions where it occurred.'4 5
Although Campbell asserted that State Farm's out-of-state conduct
provided evidence of a general motive against them, the Court concluded
that the out-of-state conduct bore no relationship to the specific harm
suffered by Campbell.'
Moreover, "[a] defendant's dissimilar acts,
independent from the acts upon which liability was premised, may not
serve as the basis for punitive damages." 47 For similar reasons, the
Court refused to view State Farm as a recidivist because no evidence
demonstrated that State Farm previously engaged in the type of
misconduct that injured Campbell in Utah.'" The Court conceded that
"evidence of other acts need not be identical to have relevance in the
calculation of punitive damages." 4 s However, the Court held that
evidence introduced by Campbell regarding the underpaying of a firstparty claimant had nothing to do with a third-party suit.5 °
The second Gore guidepost concerned the disparity between actual or
potential harm suffered and the punitive damages award.' 5 ' Before
addressing this guidepost, as it applied to the Campbell case, the Court
admitted it had "been reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits
on the ratio between harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the
punitive damages award."'52 Despite this admission, the Court again
refused to draw a bright line mathematical formula limiting such
awards." Nevertheless, the Court reviewed past precedent and stated
that "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy
due process."" The Court cited dicta in Haslip, stating that a 4-to-1

143. Id.
144. Id. at
145. Id. at
146. Id. at
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at
151. Id. at
152. Id.
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ratio between a punitive amount and a compensatory amount "might be
close to the line of constitutional impropriety."'55 The Court further
stated that this 4-to-1 ratio was also cited in Gore.'56 Although the
Court did not consider these ratios binding, it did find them instructive. "5' 7 The Court reasoned that a punitive damages award within a
single-digit multiplier of a compensatory damages award would more
likely comport with due process than a ratio of 145-to-1, like this
case.5 5 However, the Court stated that higher ratios may also comport with due process when the defendant's misconduct is particularly
egregious.'5 9
The Court subsequently looked to the particular facts of this case to
determine if State Farm's conduct was sufficiently egregious to warrant
a punitive damages award of $145 million when compensatory damages
were $1 million."6 The Court attached significance to the fact that the
injury was economic, not physical. 6 ' Also, because State Farm paid
the excess verdict,
Campbell suffered a relatively short period of
162
economic injury.

The Court found the Utah Supreme Court's justifications for the
massive punitive award unconvincing. 1"3 The failure of State Farm to
report a prior $100 million punitive damages award to its corporate
headquarters was of no relevance because the conduct that resulted in
the Texas lawsuit was dissimilar (i.e., a first-party lawsuit).'
Further, the Utah Supreme Court's reliance upon the statistical
probability of State Farm being punished and State Farm's wealth bore
"no relation to the award's reasonableness or proportionality to the
harm" actually suffered by Campbell." 5
The third and final Gore guidepost concerned "the disparity between
the punitive damages award and the 'civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases.'"'" The Court stated that a criminal
penalty is relevant only in considering the seriousness of the defendant's
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misconduct, not in determining the amount of a punitive award.'67 No
applicable criminal penalties existed under Utah law, and the only
relevant civil sanction was a $10,000 fine for an act of fraud."6 The
Court noted that the $10,000 fine was "dwarfed by the $145 million
punitive damages award."' 69 The Utah Supreme Court also supported
the disparity by alluding to State Farm's possible loss of its business
license, profit disgorgement, and potential imprisonment.7 v However,
the Court determined that these factors were references to State Farm's
"broad fraudulent scheme drawn from evidence of out-of-state and
dissimilar conduct" and irrelevant in determining the punitive damage
award.' 7 ' Therefore, the Court held that the analysis was insufficient
to warrant the punitive award.1 72
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Since its inception in 1865, the Fourteenth Amendment established
procedural, and later substantive, due process limits applicable to the
states. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified during the post-Civil
War Era to do exactly what occurred in State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell'7 -to limit the power of the sovereign
states. In Campbell the Court flexed the substantive due process
muscles of the Fourteenth Amendment and curbed a punitive damages
award. As a result of the Campbell decision, state courts will certainly
be more conscious about the amount of a punitive damages award. As
the Court did in Campbell, state courts must analyze the constitutionality of a punitive damages award by applying the three Gore factors.
However, as demonstrated in this case, the application of these factors
can be far from precise. What the Court appeared to be struggling with
(and will likely struggle with in the future) is a way to quantify due
process.
At times there can be a dichotomy in the analysis of the factors, and
this dichotomy leads to ambiguity. For example, a court could find a
defendant's conduct to be significantly reprehensible by meeting all the
criteria set forth in Campbell; nonetheless, that same court would be
tentative in awarding punitive damages over a single-digit multiplier of
the compensatory damages amount. Thus, a court is put in a position
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in which the State's legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence
are in conflict with the Constitution. Although the decision in Campbell
stated that the amount of punitive damages will depend on the
particular facts, the Court's application of the ratio factor in this case
makes one suspect as to what degree of reprehensibility would warrant
a higher punitive award. The Court explicitly refused to draw a
mathematical bright line between constitutionally acceptable and
constitutionally unacceptable punitive damages awards. Nevertheless,
the court did establish a mathematical "line" with the single-digit ratio
formula. This "line" will likely cause uncertainty and confusion among
courts in the future.
Moreover, the Court's refusal to consider out-of-state conduct is
contrary to the business and economic realities of modem society. In
today's business world, companies strive to establish a multi-state
customer base. Furthermore, many companies, like State Farm in this
case, are inherently "nationwide." The Court in essence condones a
company's nationwide misconduct by stating that the company is only
susceptible to punishment for misconduct that occurred in the state of
suit.
The Court's decision in Campbell did little to clarify exactly how the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment substantively limits
punitive damages awards. Nonetheless, the decision establishes what
state courts cannot do in calculating punitive damages. Despite the
indepth analysis of the decision, the application of the Gore factors
proved to be ambiguous at best. Consequently, the Court will likely be
revisited by a case similar to Campbell in the future because the lack of
concrete objective criteria will result in subjective interpretation.
J. KAz ESPY

